Abstract. Logic programming has developed as a rich field, built over a logical substratum whose main constituent is a nonclassical form of negation, sometimes coexisting with classical negation. The field has seen the advent of a number of alternative semantics, with Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well founded semantics, the stable model semantics, and answer-set programming standing out as the most successful of all. We show that using classical negation only, all aforementioned semantics are particular cases of a unique semantics applied to a general notion of logic program possibly transformed following a simple procedure. The notions and results presented in this paper give a classical perspective on the field of logic programming and broaden its scope, as that simple procedure suggests a number of possible transformations of a logic program, that can be classified into families, some members of some of those families matching a particular paradigm in the field. The paper demonstrates that logic programming can be developed in such a way that negation does not present itself as an intrinsically complex operator, hard to interpret properly and that needs a complicated formal apparatus to be fully apprehended, but still in a way that accommodates the semantics that have put nonclassical negation at the center of their investigations.
Background
Since its inception, the field of logic programming has embraced an increasingly complex diaspora of rules, that is, pairs of formulas referred to as "body" and "head," with the intention that if the body is true then the head is true. The bodies of the rules have eventually been allowed to contain both classical negation and nonclassical negation-classical negation being used to assert falsity, and nonclassical negation, a form of nonprovability. Classical negation and disjunction have made their ways into the heads of the rules (see [19] for a survey). It has even been advocated to use more than two kinds of negation [1, 2] . Also, a large number of constraints on the rules that make up a logic program have been proposed, based on syntactic constraints or definability properties (e.g., [13] ) or on proof-theoretic criteria (e.g., [21] ). All these developments took place as part of the advances in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning [18] .
Starting with the simplest case of sets of rules whose heads are atomic formulas and whose bodies result from the application of conjunction and disjunction to atomic formulas only, a recurring question has been: what is the intended meaning of a set of rules, that translates into: what are the intended interpretations of a set of rules? Some approaches seek a unique intended interpretation, while other approaches accommodate many. In a first-order setting, the intended interpretations have been selected from the class of all structures or from the more restricted class of all Herbrand structures, that give every individual a unique name. Alongside the various model-theoretic semantics, proof-theoretic techniques and fixed-point constructions have been developed (see [3] for a survey). As the number of approaches increased, a natural line of research has been to exhibit possible relationships between the various frameworks and seek unifications, with [15] and [12] as examples of work conducted in the last decade. This study belongs to that category of papers, but differs from previous work in many essential ways.
• It applies to extremely general sets of rules, whose heads can be negated atoms and whose bodies can be arbitrary infinitary first-order formulas.
• Rather than presenting various semantics as instances of an abstract description, it proposes a simple, base semantic, and complements it with a generic notion of transformation on the class of logic programs. So rather than proposing, for a given logic program P, a picture of the form Semantics 1 of P Semantics 2 of P Semantics 3 of P it proposes a picture of the form Base semantics of P Base semantics of P + Ω1 E 1
Base semantics of P + Ω2 E 2
Base semantics of P + Ω3 E 3
where P + Ω E represents the transformation of P into a new logic program the bodies of whose rules are possibly stronger than the bodies of the corresponding rules of P, thanks to a construction that uses a set E of literals and a set Ω of occurrences of literals in the bodies of P's rules. Semantics 1, 2 and 3 of P then correspond to particular choices of E and Ω, and intuitively receive the interpretation: make P stronger this way (with this choice of E and Ω), and apply the base semantics.
• It does not require that intended interpretations be restricted to the class of Herbrand interpretations.
• Most importantly, it uses classical negation as unique form of negation-the reason why we qualify our approach as "classical." It still accounts for the well founded semantics [9] , the stable model semantics [10] , and answer-set programming [11] , which is all the more striking that the latter is based on a syntax that includes both classical negation and nonclassical negation.
1.1. Two key principles. Our framework relies on two key principles.
The first principle is that a set of positive rules, that is, rules whose heads are atomic formulas, can be thought of as a set of rules that are both positive and negative, that is, rules whose heads are atomic formulas or negations of atomic formulas, where the negative rules are left implicit because they are fully determined by the positive rules thanks to a duality principle. This idea is far from novel; it is nothing more than a variation on the notion of Clark's completion of a logic program [5] . Clark's completion does not transform a set of positive rules into a set of positive and negative rules, but rather into a set of logical equivalences augmented with unique name axioms. Our formalization is a streamlined version of Clark's completion.
With positive rules only, one can only infer some negative information by failing to generate some positive information-the process known as negation as finite failure that certainly compels us to adopt the view that negation in logic programming is essentially nonclassical. But given both positive and negative rules, one can generate both positive and negative information, and conceive of negation as finite failure as an ingenious proof technique to generate negative information from the positive rules only, as an alternative to generating negative information using both the positive and the negative rules. This paper will demonstrate that this view is perfectly tenable; classical negation is all one needs, and negation as finite failure can be understood as part of a more general proof procedure that generates nothing but logical consequences. Not surprisingly, this will result in a semantics which, in case the class of intended interpretations is the class of Herbrand interpretations, is fundamentally equivalent to Kripke-Kleene semantics [8] . We will not make any restriction on the class of intended interpretations, and present our semantics in the most general setting.
The second principle will allow us to stick to our semantics as "the base semantics," while still accounting for the well founded semantics, the stable model semantics, and answer-set programming. This second principle is based on the idea that any of those semantics "force" some assumptions to be made in some parts of some rules, resulting in a new logic program whose base semantics is precisely the desired semantics of the original program. To force some assumptions to be made in some parts of some rules, we use a particular kind of transformation of a logical formula, that we now introduce. Consider two formulas, ϕ, of the form ∃x p(x) ∧ q(x) ∨ ∃x p(x) ∧ r(x) , and ψ, of the form
Then we can read ψ as "ϕ, where the second occurrence of p(x) is assumed to be true in case x is either a or b." Or to put it another way, if in ϕ, we hypothesize that p(a) and p(b) are true in the context given by the second occurrence of p(x) in ϕ, then we get (a logical representation equivalent to) ψ. More generally, we will formalize the notion of "transforming a formula into another by making some contextual hypotheses in the former," similar to the way ϕ can be transformed into ψ by making the hypotheses p(a) and p(b) in the context given by the second occurrence of p(x) in ϕ. Having this notion of "contextual hypothesis" and associated formula transformation in hand, our "classical" approach to logic programming will replace the question of "what should be acknowledged to fail to be derived from a logic program?'-the question at the heart of the well known semantics in the "nonclassical" approaches to logic programming-by the question of "what contextual hypotheses should be made in the bodies of the rules of a logic program?" This will allow us to revisit the main semantics that have been proposed and view them as particular members of families of semantics, and more particularly, as those members that are "maximally biased" towards negative information. For an illustration, consider a vocabulary with a constant 0, a unary function symbol s and a unary predicate symbol p, and the logic program P consisting of the following rule.
p(X) ← p(s(s(X)))
Given a natural number n, write n for the term obtained from 0 by n applications of s. Applied to P, the well founded semantics makes all of p(n), n ∈ N, false in its intended model of P, based on the principle that when a logic program presents an infinite descending chain of atoms, all members of that chain should be set to false. It turns out that this is a particular case of a more general principle, that will be formalized in the body of the paper, consistent with a large number of models of P, including in particular
• structures in which p(n) is false for all n's;
• structures in which p(n) is true for all n's;
• structures in which p(n) is false for all even n's, but true for all odd n's;
• structures in which p(n) is true for all even n's, but false for all odd n's.
So this more general principle isolates a number of Herbrand models one of which is maximally biased towards negative information, that happens to be the intended model advocated by the well founded semantics.
1.2.
A mechanistic view on rules. The rules that make up a logic program are expressions of the form head ← body that are read in many possible ways. One can view ← as a link between cause and effect and conceive of body as a statement that if activated, allows the rule to fire and head to be generated ; when formally defined, this amounts to a kind of operational semantics. Or one can view ← as a link between antecedent and consequent and conceive of body as a statement that if true, allows the rule to be logically applicable and head to be established as true; when formally defined, this amounts to a denotational semantics. A legitimate aim is to propose both an operational and a denotational semantics, and make sure that they match. In this paper, we propose an operational semantics as it is the shortest path to casting Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well founded semantics, the stable model semantics, and answer-set programming into our framework. We also have a denotational semantics but will not present it in this paper.
Let us specify a bit more the syntactic structure of rules and the process by which they fire. Recall that a formula is in negation normal form if negation is applied to atomic formulas only; so formulas in negation normal form are built from literals (atomic formulas and their negations) using disjunction, conjunction, existential quantification, and universal quantification. Assume that every rule head ← body of a logic program is such that head is a literal and body is a formula in negation normal form. Firing rules causes literals-the heads of the rules that fire-to be generated. Literals can be combined into formulas in negation normal form some of which can, thanks to the generated literals, be inferred. We impose that inferring formulas in negation normal form be a constructive process; so p∨¬p can be inferred provided that p or ¬p has been generated, and ∃x p(x) can be inferred provided that p(t) has been generated for at least one closed term t.
Having literals as heads of the rules of a logic program is natural in relation to answer-set programming. As will be seen, it is also natural in relation to the Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well founded semantics and the stable model semantics, thanks to the notions of duality of a formula and of symmetry of a logic program, that we now introduce. Given a formula ϕ in negation normal form, define the dual of ϕ as the formula ∼ϕ obtained from ϕ by changing disjunction into conjunction, conjunction into disjunction, existential quantification into universal quantification, universal quantification into existential quantification, by negating nonnegated atomic formulas, and by deleting all negation signs (in front of atomic formulas). For instance, if ϕ is
Now say that a logic program P is symmetric if the bodies of all rules are formulas in negation normal form and if for all n ∈ N and n-ary predicate symbol ℘, P contains exactly two rules of respective form
that are dual of each other in the sense that ϕ − ℘ and ϕ + ℘ are dual of each other. With these notions in hand, we will be able to view all three semantics as applied to symmetric logic programs. The working hypothesis is that all three semantics deal with symmetric logic programs even though traditionally, many rules can have a head built from a given predicate symbol and only the positive rules are explicitly given, with the negative rules being implicit; this is legitimate as negation normal form is not restrictive, a straightforward syntactic transformation allows one to merge all rules whose heads are built from a given predicate symbol, and every negative rule is perfectly determined by its dual positive rule.
It seems natural to allow rules to fire finitely often only, as this immediately suggests obvious implementations. But we can think theoretically and assume that rules are allowed to fire transfinitely many times-and all fixed point semantics happily go for it [7, 6] . So after all rules have fired any finite number of times, they could fire for the ω-th time, and then for the (ω + 1)-st time, and then for the (ω + 2)-nd time. . . and then for the (ω × 2)-nd time, etc. For instance, if every literal of the form p(n), n ∈ N, has been generated at some stage before stage ω, and if all individuals in the domains of all possible interpretations are denoted by a term of the form n, then ∀x p(x) can be inferred at stage ω, a point from which any rule whose body is ∀x p(x) can fire. Formalizing the process by which rules fire transfinitely often determines the set of literals [ P ] generated by a set P of (positive and negative) rules. It is an operational semantics, and it captures our base semantics as applied to the positive part of a symmetric logic program.
1.3. Making contextual hypotheses. We do not propose any other operational semantics than what has just been described as [ P ] . Let us make what we said earlier about the relationships to the well founded semantics, the stable model semantics and answer-set programming, a bit more precise. Consider a set E of literals. Also consider a function Ω, defined on the set of bodies of the rules in P, that returns, for the body ϕ of each rule in P, a selected set of occurrences of literals in ϕ. We could represent this mapping graphically using check marks, writing for instance
to indicate that the selected occurrences of literals in the formula ϕ defined as
are the unique occurrence of q(X) and the second occurrence of p(X). Now with E and Ω in hand, we define from P a new set of rules, denoted P + Ω E, that formalizes the request that intuitively reads: "in the bodies of the rules of P, use E as a set of hypotheses in the contexts indicated by Ω." For instance, if P contains the rule R defined as
if E is defined as {p(2n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {b(n) | n ∈ N}, and if Ω selects the unique occurrence of q(X) and the second occurrence of p(X) in the body of R then P + Ω E will contain a rule that is logically equivalent to
where . = denotes syntactic identity. We will see that in case P is symmetric, we can choose Ω and E in such a way that [ P + Ω E ] captures the well-founded semantics as applied to the positive rules of P; moreover, this choice of Ω and E is a particular case of choices made according to a simple principle, that happens to be maximally biased towards negative information. Still in case where P is symmetric, we can also choose Ω and E in ways such that [ P + Ω E ] are the stable models of the positive rules of P; similarly, these choices of Ω and E are particular cases of choices made according to a simple principle, that happen to be maximally biased towards negative information. Importantly, these correspondences are between a framework where negation is classical and frameworks where negation is meant not to be classical. Answer-set programming seems to offer a greater challenge as its syntax accommodates two kinds of negation: ¬, meant to be classical, and not, meant to be nonclassical. But the correspondence turns out to be easy to establish if one conceives of not as a syntactic variant to Ω. More precisely, conceive of not literal as a request to select ∼literal , where ∼literal is ¬literal if literal is an atom, and atom if it is of the form ¬atom. Given a set of rules P in the bodies of which both ¬ and not might occur, consider the set of rules P ′ obtained from P by replacing all occurrences of not literal with ∼literal (so only classical negation occurs in P ′ ). Then set Ω to select precisely the occurrences of literals in the bodies of the rules of P ′ that have replaced an occurrence of an expression of the form not literal in the bodies of the rules of P. For instance, if P contains the rule
then P ′ will contain the rule
and Ω will select in the body of that rule the first occurrence of ¬p(X) and the occurrence of r(X). We will see that we can naturally choose E in ways such that [ P ′ + Ω E ] are the answer-sets for P (one answer-set for each choice of E).
Logical background
N denotes the set of natural numbers and Ord the class of ordinals.
2.1. Syntax.
Definition 1.
A vocabulary is a set of (possibly nullary) function symbols and (possibly nullary) predicate symbols, none of which is the distinguished binary predicate symbol . = (identity).
As usual, a constant refers to a nullary function symbol. We will discuss later the distinction between . = and equality (=), which note can be one of the predicate symbols in a vocabulary. Accepting nullary predicate symbols in vocabularies will allow us to formalize all notions in a setting that can be either purely propositional, or purely first-order, or hybrid.
1
Notation 2. When a vocabulary contains the constant 0 and the unary function symbol s, we use n to refer to the term obtained from 0 by n applications of s.
Notation 3.
We denote by V a vocabulary.
Notation 4.
We fix a countably infinite set of (first-order) variables together with a repetition-free enumeration (v i ) i∈N of this set.
By term we mean term over V, built from the function symbols in V and the members of (v i ) i∈N . We say that a term is closed if it contains no variable.
Definition 5.
The set L ω1ω (V) of (infinitary) statements (over V) is inductively defined as the smallest set that satisfies the following conditions.
• All literals-atoms and negated atoms-(over V), namely, all expressions of the form ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) where n ∈ N, ℘ is an n-ary predicate symbol in V, and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms over V, belong to L ω1ω (V).
• All identities and distinctions (over V), namely, all expressions of the form t . = t ′ or ¬t . = t ′ , the latter being usually written t . = t ′ , where t and t ′ are terms over V, belong to L ω1ω (V).
• All expressions of the form X with X a countable set of statements over V, belong to L ω1ω (V).
1 There are a few cases of degenerated vocabularies, for instance, vocabularies that contain function symbols but all of whose predicate symbols are nullary, or vocabularies that contain at least one nonnullary predicate symbol but no constant (these vocabularies can be perfectly acceptable in the usual treatment of first-order logic, but they are degenerated cases in this setting). As none of the notions we will introduce and none of the results we will present will be invalidated by a degenerated underlying vocabulary, degenerated vocabularies are not precisely identified nor ruled out.
• All expressions of the form ∃x ϕ where x is a variable and ϕ is a statement over V that has x as a free variable, belong to L ω1ω (V).
• All expressions of the form ∀x ϕ where x is a variable and ϕ is a statement over V that has x as a free variable, belong to L ω1ω (V).
A few observations about the definition of L ω1ω (V) are in order. First, negation is assumed to be applicable to atoms only, which amounts to imposing a negation normal form, at no loss of generality. This is technically convenient, and often used in logic programming. Second, the application of quantifiers is restricted to statements that have the quantified variable as a free variable, again at no loss of generality. This is to embed the propositional framework neatly in a first-order setting: if V consists of nullary predicate symbols only then L ω1ω (V) is just the infinitary propositional language built on V. Third, if we wanted to sometimes restrict some concepts to a set of finite statements, then we would still be happy with disjunction and conjunction being unary operators on finite sets of statements. This treatment of disjunction and conjunction, which contrasts to the traditional view of binary operators on pairs of formulas, does more than make L ω1ω (V) a natural extension of the set of finite first-order formulas over V. It also simplifies the formal developments. In particular, there is no need to introduce two extra symbols true and false, as is usually done in logic programming, since ∅ is valid and can play the role of true, and ∅ is invalid and can play the role of false.
Let a statement ϕ be given. We let fv(ϕ) denote the set of free variables of ϕ. If fv(ϕ) = ∅ then ϕ is said to be closed. Let e be a statement or a term. Given n ∈ N, pairwise distinct variables x 1 , . . . , x n and closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n , we write e[t 1 /x 1 , . . . , t n /x n ] for the result of substituting simultaneously in e all free occurrences of x 1 , . . . , x n by t 1 , . . . , t n , respectively. Let e and e ′ be two statements or terms. We say that e ′ is a closed instance of e iff there exists n ∈ N, pairwise distinct variables x 1 , . . . , x n and closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that e ′ is e[t 1 /x 1 , . . . , t n /x n ]; if e ′ is known to be closed then we say "instance of e" rather than "closed instance of e." Given n ∈ N and terms t 1 , t
is a closed instance of (t 1 , . . . , t n ) iff for all members i of {1, . . . , n}, t ′ i is a closed instance of t i ; when t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n are known to be closed then we say "instance of (t 1 , . . . , t n )" rather than "closed instance of (t 1 , . . . , t n )." Though negation can be applied only to atoms and identities, we need to be able to semantically negate a statement in a syntactically friendly manner which is achieved in the following usual way: given a statement ϕ, ∼ϕ denotes
• {∼ψ | ψ ∈ X} if ϕ is of the form X; • ∀x ∼ψ if ϕ is of the form ∃x ψ;
• ∃x ∼ψ if ϕ is of the form ∀x ψ.
Given a set X of statements, we let ∼X denote {∼ϕ | ϕ ∈ X}. A set X of literals is said to be saturated just in case every closed atom is an instance of a member of at least one of the sets X and ∼X. A set of literals is said to be complete just in case it is saturated and consistent.
Given n ∈ N and statements ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , we use ϕ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕ n and ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ n as abbreviations for {ϕ i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and {ϕ i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, respectively. Also, given two statements ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 , ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 is an abbreviation for ∼ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 and ϕ 1 ↔ ϕ 2 is an abbreviation for (ϕ 1 → ϕ 2 ) ∧ (ϕ 2 → ϕ 1 ). Note that → is a logical symbol whereas ← is not: ← has been used above and will be used below to represent rules in the traditional way, separating the head of a rule from its body. In the operational semantics that is the subject of this paper, ← is not meant to receive a logical meaning.
The substatements of a statement ϕ of the form X or X are ϕ and the substatements of the members of X. The substatements of a statement ϕ of the form ∃x ψ or ∀x ψ are ϕ and the substatements of ψ. The substatements of a statement of the form ¬ψ are ¬ψ and ψ. An atom or identity is its unique substatement.
Let a statement ϕ be given. Let T be the parse tree of ϕ where the nodes are labeled with one of , , ∃x for some variable x, or ∀x for some variable x, so that the leaves of T are all (intuitive) occurrences of literals, identities and distinctions in ϕ. Then a (formal) occurrence of a literal in ϕ can be defined as the set of all formulas that appear on the branch of T whose leaf is that (intuitive) occurrence of literal.
Definition 6. Given a statement ϕ and a literal ψ, an occurrence of ψ in ϕ is defined as a ⊆-minimal set O of statements such that:
• ϕ ∈ O and ψ is the only literal in O;
• for all members of O of the form X or X, O contains a member of X;
• for all members of O of the form ∃x ξ or ∀x ξ, O contains ξ.
Example 7.
Suppose that V contains 3 nullary predicate symbols p, q and r. Let ϕ denote ¬p, {q, r, ¬p} . The occurrences of literals in ϕ are:
• {ϕ, ¬p}-an occurrence of ¬p in ϕ;
• ϕ, {q, r, ¬p}, q -an occurrence of q in ϕ;
• ϕ, {q, r, ¬p}, r -an occurrence of r in ϕ;
• ϕ, {q, r, ¬p}, ¬p -an occurrence of ¬p in ϕ.
Semantics.
Definition 8. Let a consistent set S of closed literals be given. For all closed statements ϕ, we inductively define the notion S forces ϕ, denoted S ϕ, as follows.
• For all closed terms t 1 and t 2 , S t 1 . = t 2 in case t 1 and t 2 are identical, and S t 1 . = t 2 in case t 1 and t 2 are distinct.
• For all closed literals ϕ, S ϕ iff ϕ ∈ S.
• For all countable sets X of closed statements, S X iff S forces some member of X, and S X iff S forces all members of X.
• For all statements ϕ and variables x with fv(ϕ) = {x}, S ∃x ϕ iff S ϕ[t/x] for some closed term t, and S ∀x ϕ iff S ϕ[t/x] for all closed terms t.
Given a set S of literals and a set T of statements, we say that S forces T , denoted S T , just in case either S is inconsistent or the set of closed instances of the members of S forces the closed instances of the members of T .
Definition 9.
A standard structure (over V) is a set of closed atoms.
Note the following particular cases.
• If V contains at least one constant and no nullary predicate symbol then a standard structure over V is basically a Herbrand interpretation.
• If V contains nullary predicate symbols only then a standard structure is basically a propositional interpretation.
Definition 10. Let a standard structure M be given. Let X be the complete set of closed literals such that for all closed atoms ϕ, ϕ ∈ X iff ϕ ∈ M. For all statements ϕ, we say that ϕ is true in M, or that M is a model of ϕ, iff X ϕ.
Notation 11. Let a standard structure M be given. Given a statement ϕ, we write M ϕ if M is a model of ϕ, and M ϕ otherwise. Given a set T of statements, we write M T if M is a model of all members of T , and M T otherwise.
Notation 12.
We denote by W the set of all standard structures (over V).
Given a set T of statements and a statement ϕ, we write T W ϕ if every standard model of T is a model of ϕ; if T W ϕ then we say that T logically implies ϕ in W or that ϕ is a logical consequence of T in W. The same notation and terminology also applies to sets of statements. Two statements ϕ and ψ are said to be logically equivalent in W iff they have the same models in W.
3. The denotational semantics of formal logic programs 3.1. Formal logic programs. The concepts introduced in the previous section might suggest that we are considering a notion of logical consequence, namely W , with sets of statements that can be "spoken out" on the left hand side and with statements that can be "spoken out" on the right hand side, is equivalent to the classical notion of logical consequence [17] . This means that by choosing V to be countable and by setting V ⋆ to V, one opts for a semantics based on Herbrand structures, but by setting V ⋆ to a strict subset of V that makes countably many closed terms "unspeakable of," then one opts for a semantics equivalent to the classical notion of logical consequence defined on the basis of all structures. The availability of both V and V ⋆ therefore provides a uniform and simple way to express that a result holds for the classical notion of logical consequence as well as for the more restricted notion of logical consequence that rules out nonstandard structures-by not imposing any condition on V ⋆ in the statement of that result-, or to force a result to hold for one notion of logical consequence only-by imposing the right condition on the relationship between V and V ⋆ .
Most of the work done in logic programming is developed on the basis of the class of Herbrand structures. But there are exceptions, for instance, the semantics of definite logic programs and queries can be based on either Herbrand structures or all structures: given a definite logic program T and a definite query Q, Prolog returns a computed answer substitution θ iff the universal closures of Qθ are true in all Herbrand models of T , or equivalently, are true in the minimal Herbrand model of T , or equivalently, are true in all models of T [14] . So it is sometimes desirable not to be tied to a semantics based on Herbrand structures. Moreover, we will see that such a restriction is not conceptually necessary in the sense that all concepts defined in this paper will not require any prior assumption on the relationship between V ⋆ and V; but we will sometimes have to suppose that V ⋆ is equal to V in the statements of some results. So we are going to define a notion of logic program as a set of rules built from V ⋆ , not from V.
Notation 14.
We denote by Prd(V ⋆ ) the set of predicate symbols in V ⋆ . For all n ∈ N, we denote by Prd(V ⋆ , n) the set of members of Prd(V ⋆ ) of arity n.
We want to consider sets of rules whose heads are literals and whose bodies are arbitrary. Since statements can be infinitary and can contain occurrences of . =, and since ∅ is a formula that can be used as the body of rule such as q ← ∅ to express that q is neither a fact nor the head of a rule, it is enough to provide, for every n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n), two rules: one whose head is ℘(v 1 , . . . , v n ) (which is nothing but ℘ if n = 0), and one whose head is ¬℘(v 1 , . . . , v n ) (which is nothing but ¬℘ if n = 0). For instance,
can be represented as
Definition 15. We define a formal logic program (over V ⋆ ) as a Prd(V ⋆ )-family of pairs of statements over V ⋆ , say (ϕ
The condition on variables is at no loss of generality and is imposed so as to simplify subsequent notation, and is also often used in the literature; it just states that a variable that occurs free in the body of a rule occurs in the head of that rule. Note that if the set of predicate symbols in V ⋆ is finite then finite sets of rules over V ⋆ are naturally translated into finite formal logic programs.
Example 16.
Suppose that V ⋆ consists of a constant 0, a unary function symbol s, 5 nullary predicate symbols q 1 , . . . , q 5 , and 4 unary predicate symbols p 1 , . . . , p 4 . A sample formal logic program is given by the following statements.
As V ⋆ contains both nullary and nonnullary predicate symbols, Example 16 describes a "hybrid" formal logic program, though of a simple kind as it has a purely first-order part and a purely propositional part. Let us take advantage of this example to illustrate how Definition 15 is put to use to represent rules. Recall that ∅ is valid and ∅ is invalid. For the propositional rules,
• ϕ Let us now comment on the first-order rules. The statements ϕ + pi , i ∈ {1, 2}, represent the rule
which could be rewritten as the following two rules.
So ϕ + pi , with i equal to either 1 or 2, allows one to generate all literals of the form p i (2n), n ∈ N. Obviously ϕ − p1 and ϕ − p2 are logically equivalent in W, and ϕ − pi , with i equal to either 1 or 2, allows one to generate all literals of the form ¬p i (2n + 1), n ∈ N. More precisely, the rule
could be naturally implemented from {p 1 (0), p 1 (s(s(v 1 ))) ← p 1 (v 1 )} using negation as finite failure, and its syntax is naturally related to Cark's completion of the set
is the dual of the rule p 2 (v 1 ) ← ϕ + p2 , and could be rewritten
to generate {¬p 2 (2n + 1) | n ∈ N} similarly to the way {p 2 (2n) | n ∈ N} would be generated using p 2 (v 1 ) ← ϕ 
and would not generate any literal.
The first item in Definition 8 captures the unique name axioms that come with the definition of the Clark's completion of a logic program. Making . = a logical symbol amounts to conceiving of . = as "true equality," whose interpretation is built into the logic. The usual, less restrictive notion of equality is here nonlogical and is the one that has to be axiomatized. When that notion is needed, = is put into V ⋆ , and its intended interpretation is captured by any logic program (ϕ
is of the form X where X is a superset of
and for all n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n), ϕ + ℘ is of the form X where X contains ∃v n+1 . . .
So we distinguish between identity and equality. Identity is treated as a logical symbol, equality as a nonlogical symbol. Identity is a key notion in logic programming as it is at the heart of the unification algorithm, and the usual approach is to treat identity and equality as equivalent, with the restriction to the class of Herbrand interpretations as a justification for the identification of both notions.
Our approach consists in logically defining identity from V, the vocabulary used to describe a structure, and in axiomatizing equality from V ⋆ , the vocabulary used to talk about a structure. With this approach, equality and Herbrand structures are not in a state of mutual dependency: if infinitely many closed terms are "unspeakable of" then equality as axiomatized above behaves equivalently to the way it behaves w.r.t. the classical notion of logical consequence.
Definition 17. Given a formal logic program
Of course, W applied to the classical logical form of a formal logic program P does not adequately capture the logical meaning of P. An appropriate logical reading of a formal logic program, which amounts to an appropriate denotational semantics, requires more than reading the arrow that links the left hand side and right hand side of a rule as a logical implication: it requires the explicit use of a modal operator of necessity to capture the notion of derivability, or provability, in the style of epistemic logic [20, 16] . We will complete this task in another paper in a more general setting, with a generalization of formal logic programs to sets of rules with arbitrary bodies and heads.
Notation 18. Given a formal logic program P, we let Clf(P) denote the classical logical form of P.
We have indicated that the general logic programs that are the object of KripkeKleene semantics, the well founded semantics and the stable model semantics will be seen as a particular case of formal logic programs where the negative rules are fully determined by the positive rules and can be left implicit; they are in one-to-one correspondence with the formal logic programs defined next.
Definition 19. Let a formal logic program
The next definition introduces a notion that is a key property of symmetric formal logic programs.
Definition 20. We say that a formal logic program (ϕ
Property 21. A symmetric formal logic program is locally consistent.
3.2. Generated literals. The mechanistic view on (the rules of) a formal logic program P presented in Section 1.2 allows one to talk about the literals over V ⋆ generated by P; these literals make up a set that we denote by [ P ] , and that can be described as follows.
Notation 22. Let a formal logic program
We denote by [ P ] the (unique) ⊆-minimal set of literals such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , the following holds.
•
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕ
terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ be given. In case none of the variables that occur in one of t 1 , . . . , t n is captured by quantifiers in ϕ + ℘ when simultaneously substituting v 1 , . . . , v n in ϕ + ℘ by t 1 , . . . , t n , respectively, then it is safe to write ϕ
and the first clause in Notation 22 can be simplified as:
It is easy to verify that the set of literals over V ⋆ generated by a formal logic program is closed under forcing.
Property 24. For all formal logic programs P and literals ψ over V ⋆ ,
The notion of local consistency introduced in Definition 20 will play a pivotal role in the statements of some propositions, but the more general notion of plain consistency given next is the real counterpart to the classical concept of a consistent theory.
Definition 25. A formal logic program P is said to be consistent just in case [ P ] is consistent.
Property 26. Every locally consistent formal logic program is consistent.
can involve closed literals only-a consequence of Property 24 and the next property. In the general case, [ P ] is a set of possibly nonclosed literals, and some rules might fire because their bodies are activated thanks to (a universal closure of) such literals. For instance, assume that V ⋆ contains a unary predicate symbol p and a nullary predicate symbol q, ϕ + p = ∅, and ϕ
, hence it contains q. Also, [ P ] contains p(t) for all terms t over V ⋆ , hence in particular for all closed terms t over V ⋆ . Still, if V contains at least one constant not in V ⋆ , then the set of all closed members of [ P ] of the form p(t) (with t a closed term over V ⋆ ) does not force ∀v 0 p(v 0 ), which shows that the next property would not hold if the assumption V ⋆ = V was dropped.
Property 27. Suppose that V ⋆ = V. Let a formal logic program P be given. Write
. Then the set of closed members of [ P ] is the unique ⊆-minimal set of literals such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n ,
Even though the classical logical form of a formal logic program P, formalized in Definition 17, does not capture in a satisfactory way the logical meaning of P, it is still well behaved, in the sense of the two properties that follow.
Property 28. For all formal logic programs P, Clf(P) W [ P ].
Corollary 29. For all formal logic programs P, if [ P ] is complete then the set of closed instances of atoms in [ P ] is a model of Clf(P).
Let a formal logic program P and ψ ∈ [ P ] be given. What are the subsets X of [ P ] that allow ψ to be generated by successively firing rules, starting with rules whose body can be unconditionally activated (such as ∅), till enough literals have been generated and put into X so that there exists a rule in P of the form χ ← ξ and a substitution θ such that ψ is χθ and for all closed substitutions θ ′ , ξ(θθ ′ ) can be activated thanks to the literals in X? Every such subset of [ P ] is one of the members of the set P[ψ] defined next, but P[ψ] is more inclusive as it contains the sets of literals that can be collected along a top-down attempt to derive ψ, even if that attempt is unsuccessful due to infinite descending chains or cycles. For instance, assume that V ⋆ contains 0, the unary function symbol s, a unary predicate predicate p and a nullary predicate symbol q, ϕ Notation 30. Let a formal logic program P be given. Let S be the set of literals over V ⋆ . Let ρ be the (unique) function from S into the set of subsets of S such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , the following holds.
• ρ ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) consists of all sets of the form
where Y is a subset of S such that for all closed terms t
• ρ ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) consists of all sets of the form
Then for all literals ψ over V ⋆ , we let P[ψ] denote ρ(ψ).
Let us rephrase the definition of [ P ] and list the set of literals that can be generated from P at the αth round of activations of closed instances of the bodies of P's rules.
Notation 31. Let a formal logic program P = (ϕ
be given. Inductively define a sequence ([ P ] α ) α∈Ord of sets of literals over V ⋆ as follows. Let an ordinal α be given and assume that for all β < α, [ P ] β has been defined. Then denote by [ P ] α the set of all literals over V ⋆ such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , the following holds.
With Notation 31 in hand, we can then characterize the members of P[ψ] that collect all the literals in a successful generation of ψ from P.
Property 32. Let a formal logic program P be given. Then
As can be expected, the members of P[ψ] that attest of unsuccessful attempts at deriving ψ from P due to infinite descending chains or cycles will play a special role in particular transformations of P related to the well founded semantics. Kripke-Kleene semantics is usually presented in a 3-valued logical setting. The relationship between Definition 33 and a 3-valued logical setting is the following. Let M be a partial interpretation, and let a closed atom ϕ be given. Then the truth value of ϕ in M can be set to true is ϕ ∈ M , to false if ¬ϕ ∈ M , and to a third value or to "undefined" otherwise. Definition 34 then generalizes the notion of a partial model of a general logic program-that as we have pointed out, can be seen as a symmetric formal logic program whose negative rules have not been explicitly written.
Definition 34. Let a logic program
Given a formal logic program P, a ⊆-minimal partial model of P is referred to more simply as a minimal partial model of P. Proposition 35 expresses that the generalization of Kripke-Kleene semantics given in Definition 34 is equivalent to the denotational semantics of consistent formal logic programs, provided that V ⋆ is equal to V, which is the underlying assumption of all frameworks where that semantics is considered. Note that Proposition 35 still applies to more general frameworks as it deals with formal logic programs that might not be symmetric.
Proposition 35. Assume that V ⋆ = V. Let a consistent formal logic program P be given. Then P has a unique minimal partial model, which is nothing but the set of closed instances of members of [ P ].
Proof. Write P as (ϕ
. Let X denote the set of partial models of P. It is immediately verified that:
• the set of closed instances of members of α∈Ord [ P ] α is included in X;
• the set of closed instances of members of α∈Ord [ P ] α belongs to X.
Hence X, being equal to the set of closed instances of members of α∈Ord [ P ] α , is a partial model of P. We conclude with Property 32. 4 . Extensors, and relationships to particular semantics 4.1. Extensors. We now formalize the operation, discussed in Section 1.3, of transforming a formal logic program P into another formal logic program P + Ω E, where Ω selects some occurrences of literals in the bodies of P's rules and E is a set of literals, the intended meaning of P + Ω E being: "in P, assume E in the contexts indicated by Ω." Definition 36 defines the kind of formal object denoted by Ω. Notation 37 specifies two particular cases the first of which will play a special role in relation to the stable model semantics and the well founded semantics. Recall Definition 6 for the notion of occurrence of literal in a statement. In Section1.3, we gave the following introductory example. Assume that V ⋆ contains the constant 0, the unary function symbol s and three unary predicate symbols p, q and r. Let P be a formal logic program, say (ϕ
, such that ψ + p will be defined in such a way that it is logically equivalent in W to
If we modify the example and assume that E is rather set to {p(s(s(v 0 )))}, then ψ + p will be defined in such a way that it is logically equivalent in W to
The eventual definition of P + Ω E for arbitrary choices of P, Ω and E, will be a straightforward generalization of those examples. One should keep in mind that E is meant to be a set of literals over V ⋆ (as opposed to a set of literals over V), with V and V ⋆ being possibly different, which means that again, we cannot assume in full generality that E can be restricted to consist of closed literals only.
The notation that follows should be thought of as recording the set of all possible substitutions thanks to which a given statement ϕ can be shown to subsume some member of a set E of statements.
Notation 38. Given a statement ϕ, n ∈ N, pairwise distinct variables x 1 , . . . , x n with fv(ϕ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and a set E of statements, we let Unif(ϕ, E) denote the set of all statements of the form
where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms over V ⋆ , m is a member of N, y 1 , . . . , y m are pairwise distinct variables, all distinct from x 1 , . . . , x n , {y 1 , . . . , y m } is the set of variables that occur in at least one of t 1 , . . . , t n and for all closed terms t
is an instance of a member of E.
The notation that follows describes the operations of strengthening or weakening some occurrences of literals in a given statement: given a statement ϕ, a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ and a set E of literals,
• ⊙
O E ϕ denotes the statement obtained from ϕ by assuming that every occurrence of literal in ϕ that belongs to O is false unless it subsumes some member of E; • ⊚ O E ϕ denotes the statement obtained from ϕ by assuming that every occurrence of literal in ϕ that belongs to O is true if it subsumes some member of E.
The first operation prepares the technical definition of a formal logic program obtained from P and E, and denoted P | Ω E, that will be useful for formalizing in our setting answer-set programming, the stable model semantics, and the well founded semantics; for the latter two, Ω will actually be set to − P , which prompts for a special notation, that of Notation 40. The second operation prepares the definition of P + Ω E. Both P | Ω E and P + Ω E are formally defined in Notation 42.
Notation 39. Let E be a set of literals. We inductively define for all statements ϕ and sets O of occurrences of literals in ϕ two statements ⊙ O E ϕ and ⊚ O E ϕ. Let ϕ ∈ L ω1ω (V) and a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ be given.
• Suppose that ϕ is an identity, a distinction, or a literal.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form X or X. For all ψ ∈ X, let O ψ be the (unique) set o of occurrences of literals in ψ with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form ∃x ψ or ∀x ψ. Let O ψ be the (unique) set o of occurrences of literals in ψ with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
Notation 40. Given ϕ ∈ L ω1ω (V) and a set E of literals, and letting O be the set of occurrences of negated atoms in ϕ, we write ⊙
Example 41. Suppose that P is the formal logic program of Example 16 and
and
which are logically equivalent in W to Notation 42. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given.
. Let a set E of literals be given.
The transformation of a formal logic program P into a formal logic program of the form P + Ω E will be of interest only in case Ω and E are chosen in such a way that the condition in the definition that follows holds.
Definition 43. Let a formal logic program P be given. We call an extensor for (P, Ω) any set E of literals over
The next property justifies the terminology.
Property 44. For all formal logic programs P, literal markers Ω for P and extensors
The next property will play a key role when we establish the relationship between this framework and the three semantics besides Kripke-Kleene semantics under consideration in this paper.
Property 45. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. If either all closed instances of members of
Before we can end this section, we need one more technical notation. In relation to the well founded semantics, we will see that one needs to consider not a single extensor, but a family of extensors: a formal logic program P will be extended to a formal logic program of the form P + Ω E 0 , that will itself be extended to a formal logic program of the form P + Ω E 0 ∪ E 1 determined by P + Ω E 0 and an occurrence marker Ω 1 for P + Ω E 0 , that will itself be extended to a formal logic program of the form P + Ω E 0 ∪ E 1 ∪ E 2 determined by P + Ω E 0 ∪ E 1 and an occurrence marker
etc., will not be arbitrary: they will all select occurrences of literals in P + Ω E 0 , P + Ω E 0 ∪E 1 , etc., determined by Ω, even though these occurrences of literals are taken from different formal logic programs as P is being successively transformed. For instance, in Example 41, the occurrence of
, though they are formally two different sets of statements. The following notation will allow us to formally express Ω 1 , Ω 2 , Ω 3 , etc., from Ω and E 0 , E 1 , E 2 , etc., and write Ω + E 0 for Ω 1 , 
Notation 47. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P and a set E of literals be given.
.
Special extensors.
The task of casting the well founded semantics, the stable model semantics and answer-set programming into our framework boils down to defining appropriate literal markers and extensors. At a fundamental level, the question "what are legitimate contextual assumptions?" replaces the question "how does negation behave?" We now define the key properties that literal markers and extensors can enjoy and allow one to complete that task.
Definition 48. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, and an extensor E for (P, Ω) be given.
• We say that E is imperative iff for all closed literals ϕ, ϕ is not an instance of a member of
• We say that E is supporting iff for all ψ ∈ E, some member of (P + Ω E) [ψ] is included in [ P ].
• Given an ordinal α, we say that E is α-foundational iff there exists a sequence (E β ) β<α of sets of literals such that E = β<α E β and for all ordinals β < α, E β is a supporting extensor for (P + Ω γ<β E γ , Ω + γ<β E γ ).
• We say that E is foundational iff there exists a sequence (E α ) α∈Ord of sets of literals such that E = α∈Ord E α and for all ordinals α, β<α E β is an α-foundational extensor for (P, Ω).
Already observe the following properties.
Proof. There is nothing to prove if V contains no constant, so suppose otherwise. Let n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) be given. It is easy to verify that there exists 3 sets X, Y and Z of n-tuples of terms over V ⋆ such that for all closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n , one of the following conditions holds.
• Both ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) and ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) are instances of members of E and (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an instance of some member of X, but not of any member of Y ∪ Z.
• ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an instance of a member of E, ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is not an instance of any member of E, and (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an instance of some member of Y , but not of any member of X ∪ Z.
• ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an instance of a member of E, ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is not an instance of any member of E, and (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an instance of some member of Z, but not of any member of X ∪ Y .
Let a nonnullary function symbol f in V \ V ⋆ be given. Then there exists an n-tuple (ι 1 , . . . , ι n ) of pairwise distinct closed terms that all start with f . Obviously, for all terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , if (ι 1 , . . . , ι n ) is an instance of (t 1 , . . . , t n ) then t 1 , . . . , t n are pairwise distinct variables. So
• either all n-tuples of closed terms are instances of some member of X, in which case
• or all n-tuples of closed terms are instances of some member of Y , in which case [ P + Ω E ] contains all literals over V ⋆ of the form ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ), • or all n-tuples of closed terms are instances of some member of Z, in which case [ P + Ω E ] contains all literals over V ⋆ of the form ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ), completing the proof of the proposition.
The following example shows that if V \ V ⋆ does not contain a function symbol of arity 1 at least, then the notion of imperative extensor does not have to be degenerate.
Example 54. Suppose that V consists of 0, s and a binary predicate symbol p, and assume that V ⋆ = {s, p}.
. Let E be the set of literals defined as
Set Ω = (∅, ∅) . Then E is an imperative extensor for (P, Ω) and [ P + Ω E ], which is obviously equal to [ P ], is the set of all atoms over V ⋆ of the form p(t, t).
To summarize the previous considerations, we have not assumed in Definition 48 that V ⋆ and V are equal simply because none of the results we want to establish need that assumption to be made. But the notion of imperative extensor (which is the key notion in relation to answer-set programming and the stable model semantics) is defined in such a way that cases where that notion takes interesting values are cases where V ⋆ = V or where V ⋆ and V take very specific values.
A few technical results.
The technical results that follow will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 55. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. For all sets E and
Proof. Let E and F be two sets of literals with E ⊆ F . It is immediately verified by induction that for all ordinals α,
We conclude with Property 32.
Lemma 56. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. For all sets E and F of literals,
Proof. Let E and F be two sets of literals. Let ordinal λ be such that
It is easy to verify by induction that for all ordinals α,
Proposition 57. Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for P be given. Let a set X of implicative extensors for (P, Ω) be such that X is consistent. Then X is an extensor for (P, Ω).
We show by induction that for all ordinals α, E ∪[ P + Ω E ] α is consistent. Let an ordinal α be given and assume that for all β < α, E ∪[ P + Ω E ] β is consistent. Since P is locally consistent and E is consistent (used in the case where α = 0), there exists no n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n such that
α cannot be inconsistent unless the set of closed instances of members of [ P + Ω E ] α intersects the set of closed instances of members of ∼E. Assume that the set of closed instances of members of [ P + Ω E ] α indeed intersects the set of closed instances of members of ∼E. Let ordinal λ be least such that there exists a closed literal ϕ with F ∈X [ P + Ω F ] λ ϕ and [ P + Ω E ] α ∼ϕ. Let F ∈ X and a closed literal ϕ be such that
We derive from the hypothesis on α and the choice of λ that Y is consistent. Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n be such that ϕ is ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ). By the choice of ϕ, Y forces both ϕ
, which is impossible since P is locally consistent. We con-
Corollary 58. Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for P be given. Let X be a set of supporting extensors for (P, Ω) such that X is consistent. Then X is a supporting extensor for (P, Ω).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Property 50 and Proposition 57.
To end this section, let us give a simple application of some of the previous observations. Complete sets of literals can obviously be identified with standard structures, hence it is natural to ask whether a complete set of the form [ P + Ω E ] is a model of the classical logical form of P. It is easy to answer that question positively for implicative extensors.
Proposition 59. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, and an implicative extensor E for (P, Ω) be such that [ P + Ω E ] is complete. Then the set of closed instances of atoms in [ P + Ω E ] is a model of Clf(P).
Proof.
Obviously, for all statements ϕ and sets O of occurrences of literals in ϕ, ϕ logically implies ⊚ O E ϕ in W. It follows that Clf(P + Ω [ P + Ω E ]) logically implies Clf(P) in W. Since E ⊆ [ P + Ω E ], we derive from Lemma 55 that [ P + Ω E ] is a subset of P + Ω [ P + Ω E ] . Moreover, Lemma 56 implies that P + Ω [ P + Ω E ] is a subset of [ P + Ω E ]. Hence the complete set [ P + Ω E ] is equal to P + Ω [ P + Ω E ] ,and we derive from Corollary 29 that[ P + Ω E ] logically implies Clf(P + Ω [ P + Ω E ]) in W. We conclude that [ P + Ω E ] W Clf(P).
4.4.
Relationship to answer-set programming. In this section we consider the enrichment of L ω1ω (V) with a second negation operator, written not, that can be applied to any literal, and to literals only. We do not develop the formalism beyond this minimalist syntactic consideration as we use not to remind the reader of the usual definition of answer-sets, but we will not use it in an alternative definition of answer-sets that will immediately be seen to be equivalent to the usual definition. For this purpose, let us first introduce some preliminary notation. Let a statement ϕ and a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ be given. We define a member ϕ[O] of the enrichment of L ω1ω (V) with not, thanks to the inductive construction that follows.
Now let a formal logic program P and a literal marker
is what is known in the literature as a general logic program, a kind of logic program with two kinds of negation, ¬ and not. Conversely, let a general logic program G that, without loss of generality, is written in such a way that for every n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n), G has one rule whose head is ℘(v 1 , . . . , v n ), one rule whose head is ¬℘(v 1 , . . . , v n ), and no other rule whose head is of the form ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ). Then there exists a unique formal logic program P and a unique literal marker Ω for P such that G = P[Ω].
For instance, assume that V consists of 4 nullary predicate symbols p 1 , p 2 , p 3 and p 4 . Suppose that P is given by the following statements.
is ∅ Suppose that Ω is given by the following sets.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the extensors for (P, Ω) are: 4 } which contain at least one of p 2 and ¬p 4 , in which case
Out of these, only {¬p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , ¬p 3 , p 4 } is imperative. Moreover, there is a unique answer-set for P[Ω], namely {¬p 1 , p 2 , p 4 }.
Having realized that the class of general logic programs is in one-to-one correspondence with the class of pairs (P, Ω) where P is a formal logic program and Ω a literal marker for P (the correspondence in question putting a pair of the form (P, Ω) in relation to P[Ω]), it is easy to see that if one assumes that V ⋆ is equal to V, then Definition 60 amounts to the notion of an answer-set-recall the discussion at the end of Section 4.2 about not assuming that V ⋆ and V are equal.
Definition 60. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. An answer-set for ( P, Ω ) is a partial interpretation M for which there exists a saturated set E of literals over V ⋆ with the following property.
• For all closed literals ϕ, ϕ ∈ M iff ∼ϕ is not an instance of a member of E.
• M is the set of closed instances of members of
The next proposition shows that the concept of imperative extensor fully characterizes the notion of answer-set.
Proposition 61. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, and a set E of literals over V ⋆ be given. Let F be the set of closed instances of members of E, and let M be the set of all closed literals ϕ with ∼ϕ / ∈ F . Then E is an imperative extensor for ( P, Ω ) iff M is an answer-set for ( P, Ω ).
Proof. Assume that E is an imperative extensor for ( P, Ω ). Since [ P + Ω E ] is consistent, we infer from Definition 48 that the closed instances of the member of [ P + Ω E ] are instances of members of E. Hence by Property 45,
We infer that M is an answer-set for ( P, Ω ).
Conversely, assume that M is an answer-set for (P, Ω) (hence M is consistent). By Definition 60, the closed instances of the members of [ P | Ω F ] belong to F . Hence by Property 45,
We infer that M is the set of closed instances of the members of [ P + Ω E ] and E is an imperative extensor for ( P, Ω ).
In answer-set programming, not ϕ intuitively means that ϕ is not provable. The way to go from the usual presentation of answer-set programming to our setting is to replace global hypotheses of the form "assume that ϕ is not provable" by local hypotheses of the form "assume here that ∼ϕ holds." What is then derived has to be consistent with any individual local hypothesis. Moreover, whenever an assumption can be made, that assumption should be made, unless it contradicts what can then be derived (from the formal logic program together with the assumptions that are made). In the usual treatment of answer-set programming, the justification to the approach is that if ϕ cannot be derived then ϕ is indeed not provable. In our setting, we just impose a particular constraint on extensors, that can be paraphrased as: make as many assumptions as possible, in all allowed contexts, except for assumptions that individually contradict what can then be derived.
4.5.
Relationship to the stable model semantics. The stable model semantics takes the class of sets of positive rules as the object of study; but as mentioned repeatedly, this class is in one-to-one correspondence with the class of symmetric formal logic programs, hence it is legitimate to study the stable model semantics on the basis of the latter. If one assumes that V ⋆ is equal to V, then Definition 62 captures the notion of stable model-again, recall the discussion at the end of Section 4.2 about not assuming that V ⋆ and V are equal. Note how Notation 39 is being used in Definition 62 to basically describe the Lloyd-Topor transformation.
Definition 62. Let a formal logic program
A partial interpretation M is said to be stable for P iff there exists a complete set E of literals over V ⋆ such that M is the set of closed instances of members of E and for all closed atoms ϕ, ϕ ∈ M iff
Note that the condition on E only depends on the positive rules of P. In Definition 62, P is not assumed to be symmetric; but it is essential to assume that P is symmetric to obtain the result stated in the proposition that follows. Together with Property 51, this proposition shows that both concepts of imperative and implicative extensors relative to the literal markers that collect all occurrences of all negated atoms fully characterize the notion of stable model.
Proposition 63.
For all symmetric formal logic programs P and complete sets E of literals over V ⋆ , the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P iff E is an implicative extensor for (P, − P ).
Proof. Let a symmetric formal logic program
and a complete set E of literals over V ⋆ be given. Let E + be the set of atoms in E, and let E − be the set of negated atoms in E. Suppose that the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P. Then Clf(P | − P E) logically implies E + in W. Since negation does not occur in any implication in Clf(P | − P E), it follows that E + is a subset of [ P | − P E ]. Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n), and closed terms t 1 , . . . , t n be given. Since E is complete and P is symmetric, E forces one and only one of ϕ
is an instance of a member of E. Then E ϕ
It is then easy to conclude that for all closed literals ϕ, [ P | Ω E ] ϕ iff ϕ is an instance of a member of E. Together with Property 45, this completes the verification that E is an implicative extensor for (P, − P ).
Conversely, assume that E is an implicative extensor for (P, − P ). By Property 45 again,
Clearly, Clf(P | − P E), being logically equivalent in W to the complete set E, is also logically equivalent to E − ∪ X in W. Hence E − ∪ X W E + . Since negation does not occur in any implication in X, this implies that X W E + , which completes the verification that the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P.
Supporting and foundational extensors.
The well founded semantics is related to the notion of foundational extensor, and we will need to establish some of the properties that the latter enjoys in order to establish the relationship. The notion of supporting extensor has mainly been introduced as a useful building block in the definition of foundational extensors, but it is interesting in its own right. By Property 50, supporting extensors are implicative extensors, which means that the assumptions that make up such extensors are guaranteed to be generated. But more is true. Intuitively, given a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P, a supporting extensor for (P, Ω) is sufficiently rich in literals to "generate itself" using P and Ω, and not contradict any literal generated by P + Ω E. So for all members ϕ of a supporting extensor E for (P, Ω), there exists a "constructive proof" of ϕ, from the rules formalized as P, such that the only literals that occur in the proof either are in [ P ] or are members of E that occur in contexts where Ω accepts that they be assumed. The next example will help grasp the idea in the simple case where Ω accepts that any literal be assumed in any context, and where no member of [ P ] is actually needed in the "constructive proofs." So with P defined in Example 7, a particular supporting extensor for (P, ± P ) is
It will allow one to transform P into a formal logic program that provides a fourth way of generating the set of even numbers and its complement, using the predicate symbol p 4 -besides the three options already available with p 1 , p 2 and p 3 .
Let E be a supporting extensor for (P, Ω). Usually, [ P + Ω E ] encompasses more literals than those in [ P ] ∪ E. A nice property of the class of supporting extensors for (P, Ω) is that it actually contains [ P + Ω E ].
Proposition 65. For all formal logic programs P, literal markers Ω for P and implicative extensors E for (P, Ω), [ P + Ω E ] is a supporting extensor for (P, Ω).
Proof. By Lemmas 55 and 56,
The proposition follows immediately.
Subsuming the notion of foundational extensor given in Definition 48 is the notion of foundational chain, that needs to be made explicit in order to easily investigate the properties of the foundational extensors. Given a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for (P, Ω), a foundational chain for (P, Ω) can be described as follows.
• Start with a supporting extensor E 0 for (P, Ω).
• Propose a supporting extensor E 1 for (P + Ω E 0 , Ω + E 0 ).
• Propose a supporting extensor
Formally, this translates into the following definition.
Definition 66. Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given.
Given an ordinal α, an α-foundational chain for (P, Ω) is a sequence (E β ) β<α of sets of literals over V ⋆ such that for all β < α, E β is a supporting extensor for (P + Ω γ<β E γ , Ω + γ<β E γ ).
A foundational chain for (P, Ω) is a sequence (E α ) α∈Ord of sets of literals over V ⋆ such that for all ordinals α, (E β ) β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P, Ω).
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. By Definitions 48 and 66,
• for all ordinals α and α-foundational chains (E β ) β<α for (P, Ω), β<α E β is an α-foundational extensor for (P, Ω) and for all foundational chains (E α ) α∈Ord for (P, Ω), α∈Ord E α is a foundational extensor for (P, Ω); • for all ordinals α and for all α-foundational extensors E for (P, Ω), there exists an α-foundational chain (E β ) β<α for (P, Ω) such that E = β<α E β and for all foundational extensors E for (P, Ω), there exists a foundational chain (E α ) α∈Ord for (P, Ω) such that E = α∈Ord E α .
The first essential property of foundational extensors and α-foundational extensors that we have to prove is that they are implicative. This is expressed in Proposition 67 and Corollary 68.
Proposition 67. For all formal logic programs P, literal markers Ω for P and ordinals α, all α-foundational extensors for (P, Ω) are implicative.
Proof. Proof is by induction. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, an ordinal α, and an α-foundational chain (E β ) β<α for (P, Ω) be given. Assume that for all β < α,
If α is a limit ordinal then it follows immediately from Lemma 55 that β<α
Moreover, it follows from Property 50 that E δ is a subset of
Corollary 68. For all formal logic programs P and literal markers Ω for P, all foundational extensors for (P, Ω) are implicative.
Corollary 69. For all formal logic programs P, literal markers Ω for P and foundational extensors E for (P, Ω), there exists an ordinal α such that E is an α-foundational extensor for (P, Ω).
The converse to Corollary 69 holds.
Proposition 70. For all formal logic programs P, literal markers Ω for P and ordinals α, all α-foundational extensors for (P, Ω) are foundational.
Proof. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, an ordinal α, and an α-foundational chain (E β ) β<α for (P, Ω) be given. By Propositions 65 and 67,
Obviously, (E β ) β∈Ord is a foundational chain for (P, Ω). The proposition follows immediately.
Given a formal logic program P, the next proposition will allow us to relate our framework to the well founded semantics for P either in terms of a particular foundational extensor E for (P, − P ), or in terms of [ P + − P E ] for a particular foundational extensor E for (P, − P ).
Proposition 71. Let a formal logic program P, a literal marker Ω for P, and a foundational extensor E for (P, Ω) be given. Then all subsets of [ P + Ω E ] that contain E are foundational extensors for (P, Ω).
Proof. Let a foundational chain (E α ) α∈Ord for (P, Ω) be given. Let X be a subset of [ P + Ω E ] that contains E. Let (F α ) α∈Ord be the family of literals over V ⋆ such that for all ordinals α, F 2α = β<α E β and F 2α+1 = [ P + Ω β<α E β ] ∩ X. Using Lemmas 55 and 56, it is easy to verify that (F α ) α∈Ord is a foundational chain for (P, Ω) and α∈Ord
We now state a counterpart to Corollary 58 for foundational chains.
Proposition 72. Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for P and a set I be given. Let a set of foundational chains for (P, Ω) of the form
Proof. Only one direction of the proposition requires a proof. The argument is by induction. For all α ∈ Ord, set F α = σ∈I E σ α . Assume that α∈Ord F α is consistent. Let an ordinal α be given, and assume that for all β < α, (F γ ) γ<β is a β-foundational chain for (P, Ω). If α is a limit ordinal then (F β ) β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P, Ω) by definition. Assume that α is of the form δ + 1. It follows from Proposition 67 that for all σ ∈ I, the set
is a union of supporting extensors for (P, Ω). So to complete the proof of the proposition, it suffices by Corollary 58 to show that [ P + Ω γ<δ F γ ] ∪ F δ is consistent. By Lemma 55 and Proposition 67,
being a subset of a consistent set, is consistent.
As an application of Proposition 72, we can follow the main path in the field of logic programming, be biased towards negative information, and get the following corollary.
Proposition 73. For all locally consistent formal logic programs P, there exists a ⊆-maximal foundational extensor for (P, − P ).
Proof. Let a locally consistent formal logic program P be given. By Proposition 72, there exists a ⊆-maximal set E of negated atoms over V ⋆ that is a foundational extensor for (P, − P ). By Proposition 71, [ P + − P E ] is a foundational extensor for (P, − P ). Moreover, it is easy to verify that for all extensors F for (P, − P ), all closed instances of negated atoms in F are instances of members of E, and that all closed instances of all members of F belong to [ P + − P E ].
4.7.
Relationship to the well-founded semantics. The well founded semantics takes the class of sets of positive rules as object of study; so again, it is legitimate to study the well founded semantics on the basis of the class of symmetric formal logic programs. But we will see that the hypothesis of symmetry is too strong: it is enough to focus on locally consistent formal logic programs. If one assumes that V • E + α is defined as the set of closed instances of literals ϕ over V ⋆ with
• E − α is defined as the set of closed instances of the ⊆-largest set X of negated atoms over V ⋆ such that for all ϕ ∈ X, there exists a member Y of P[ϕ] such that all closed instances of all members of Y belong to E Recall that by Proposition 73, we can talk about "the ⊆-maximal foundational extensor for (P, − P )" when P is a locally consistent formal logic program. The next proposition shows that this extensor fully characterizes the notion of well founded model. The proposition does more than embed the well founded semantics into our framework as it encompasses all formal logic programs that are locally consistent rather than just symmetric, and as it does not assume that V ⋆ and V are equal.
Proposition 75. Let P be a locally consistent formal logic program, and let E be the ⊆-maximal foundational extensor for (P, − P ). Then the set of closed instances of members of E is the well-founded model of P.
Proof. Let (E α ) α∈Ord be a foundational chain for (P, − P ) with α∈Ord E α = E such that for all foundational chains (F α ) α∈Ord for (P, − P ), if α∈Ord F α = E then for all ordinals α, F α ⊆ E α . Inductively define by induction a sequence (E + α ) α∈Ord of atoms over V ⋆ and a sequence (E − α ) α∈Ord of negated atoms over V ⋆ . Let an ordinal α be given, and assume that E + β and E − β have been defined for all β < α. Define E + α as the ⊆-minimal set of atoms over V ⋆ with the property that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , if
for all closed terms t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n such that (t ′ 1 , . . . , t ′ n ) is an instance of (t 1 , . . . .t n ) then ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ E + α . Define E − α as the union of all sets X of negated atoms over V ⋆ that have the property that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ , if ¬℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ X then E It is easy to verify by induction that for all ordinals α, E + α ∪ E − α is included in [ P + − P E ], with all closed instances of members of E − α belonging to E α . Hence the well-founded model of P is included in the set of closed instances of members of [ P + − P E ].
Conversely, it is easy to verify by induction that for all ordinals α, there exists ordinals δ and δ ′ such that β<α E β ⊆ E + δ ∪ E − δ and for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V ⋆ , n) and terms t 1 , . . . , t n over V ⋆ ,
• if ℘(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ [ P + − P β<α E β ] then for all closed terms t Hence the set of closed instances of members of [ P + − P E ] is included in the well-founded model of P.
Conclusion
We have a presented a framework whose development has been guided by conceptual and formal simplicity. Far from restricting the field, it allows one to retrieve the usual semantics and to tighten their relationships. It has unified all those semantics under the umbrella of a unique semantics coupled with a notion of transformation of a logic program that captures the making of contextual hypotheses. Various constraints on these transformations result in families of "semantics" for the original program, with the well known ones as particular cases. One can explore the other members of those families. For instance, the well founded semantics corresponds to the particular foundational extensor that is maximally biased towards negative information. But the class of foundational extensors is rich; it encompasses an extensor that is maximally biased towards positive information, and infinitely many extensors that vary the overall quantity and the mix of positive and negative information. One can also explore totally different families besides the imperative, implicative, supporting and foundational extensors. There are endless possibilities of potentially interesting extensors.
We have carefully not defined a formal logic program as a set of logical formulas. We have chosen to model the behavior of a set of rules that can fire transfinitely often, hence to provide an operational semantics, which does not require to represent rules as logical formulas. Since the classical logical form of a formal logic program P does not adequately represent the behavior of P, that classical logical form does not provide a sound basis for a declarative semantics. This is not necessarily because the logical symbols, including negation, should receive a different meaning than they do in the classical setting of first-order logic. An intuitionistic interpretation of the logical symbols would not provide an adequate semantics either, though it has been applied to particular classes of logic programs [4] . Still it is perfectly possible to provide a semantics where the logical symbols keep their classical meaning, and where the behavior of a formal logic program can be described in terms of a classical notion of logical consequence. Indeed, let P be a consistent formal logic program. We can then show that given a literal ϕ, T ⋆ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ [ P ], where T is some set of modal statements that is obtained from P as easily as the classical logical form, and where ⋆ is a classical notion of logical consequence applied to interpretations that generalize standard structures, in a framework that generalizes epistemic logic. So there is an easy translation from the language for the operational semantics to the language for the declarative semantics, and conversely, but such a translation is needed; both languages cannot be the same. Another paper will be devoted to this topic in a more general setting where formal logic programs will be generalized to sets of rules with arbitrary bodies and arbitrary heads. 
